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DOES BELONGING ACCOMPANY BELIEVING?
CORRELATIONS AND TRENDS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND
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REVIEW OF RELIGIOUS RESEARCH 2008, VOLUME 50(1): PAGES 16-34
Using the European and World Value Surveys from 1981, 1990, and 2000, this paper
examines trends in Christian beliefs, church attendance, and the relationship between
believing and belonging. It further looks at the influence of religious pluralism on
this relationship in Western Europe and North America. The main finding of this study
is that in most countries there is no growing gap between Christian believing and
Christian belonging. Indeed, the relationship between believing and belonging at the
individual level has remained practically unchanged in the Western world over the
past two decades. The slight weakening in the relation between believing and belong-
ing measured for some countries stems from the fact that in those countries both
believing and belonging declined, but the decline in belonging was stronger. More-
over, a higher degree of religious pluralism does not result in a stronger association
between believing and belonging, as would be expected from supply-side theory. 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
There is abundant evidence that both church membership rates and church attendancehave declined in most West European societies over the past decades (Bruce 2002;Davie 1994, 2003; Lechner 1996; Martin 1991; Stark and Iannaccone 1996). Although
secularization and supply-side theory both explain why church membership rates and atten-
dance have dwindled, the question of whether Christian beliefs have declined as well, result-
ing in a growing gap between believing and belonging, is not settled yet. This paper examines
trends in the relationship between Christian believing and Christian belonging between
1981 and 2000 and investigates the extent to which religious pluralism affects this rela-
tionship. 
Davie (1990a, 1994, 2002) added another dimension to the debate about secularization
by explicitly focusing on the relationship between “belonging,” that is, church membership
and church attendance, and “believing,” that is, adherence to religious beliefs. Davie’s analy-
ses showed that countries with low church membership rates do not necessarily have low
levels of religious belief, which she subsequently called believing without belonging (Davie
1990b; 1994; 2002). Her general hypothesis is that in Western societies a growing number
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of people uphold religious beliefs without formal attachment to a church. This hypothesis,
however, was only tested by comparing church membership rates and average religious belief
at the country level. To avoid the risk of the so-called ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950),
which arises from aggregating religious participation and religious belief, we explicitly exam-
ine the relationship between “believing” and “belonging” of individuals in Western Europe
and North America. Furthermore, we derive rival hypotheses about the trend in this rela-
tionship from secularization theory and supply-side theory.
Secularization theory states that religious practice and belief are directly related and that
current trends are towards fewer individuals attending religious practice and towards fewer
individuals expressing religious beliefs, although these trends possibly move at different
speeds and in different directions (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Martin 1978; Wilson 1982).
Because these two trends are related, the relationship between believing and belonging should
by and large be stable over time. Alternatively, the relationship could also become stronger
if more people who believe also start belonging, and people who stopped belonging, later,
also stop believing. According to supply-side theory, religious belief is an exogenous phe-
nomenon, which is not affected by the extent to which individuals attend religious services.
Subsequently, a decrease in religious practice is not necessarily accompanied by a weaken-
ing of religious belief or an adoption of secular ideas (Iannaccone 1997; Stark 1997). Con-
sequently, the relationship between believing and belonging should decline over time. Given
these different expectations, our first research question has two parts:
1a. What are the trends in religious belief (believing) and religious practice (belonging) in West-
ern Europe and North America between 1981 and 2000?
1b. What is the trend in the relationship between believing and belonging in Western Europe and
North America between 1981 and 2000?
The concept of religious pluralism has played a key role in both secularization and sup-
ply-side theory. Secularization theory states that religious pluralism induces lower levels of
both believing and belonging, because alternative religions tend to challenge the plausibili-
ty structure of well-established beliefs (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002). This may cause a decline
in both individual belief and individual belonging. If this decline occurs at roughly the same
pace, the relationship between believing and belonging is expected to be unaffected by the
degree of pluralism in a society. In contrast, supply-side theory states that religious plural-
ism fosters religious participation, as societies with religious monopolies have large unmet
religious needs while societies with a high degree of religious pluralism are more likely to
satisfy diverse religious needs (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). If this is the case, a strong rela-
tionship between believing and belonging should be found in societies with more religious
pluralism. Our second research question aims to provide insight into the relationship between
religious pluralism and the extent to which individual believing and belonging go hand in
hand:
2. To what extent did religious pluralism affect the relationship between believing and belonging
in Western Europe and North America between 1981 and 2000?
This paper aims to improve upon previous research in three ways. First, neither Davie
(1990a, 1990b, 1994, 2002) nor her critics (Voas and Crockett 2005) examined the rela-
tionship between believing and belonging at the individual level. Instead, they studied the
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relation between sociodemographic characteristics and religious commitment at an aggre-
gate country level. However, comparing church membership rates and percentages of peo-
ple who express Christian beliefs may be misleading. For instance, if the percentage of people
expressing beliefs is higher than the percentage attending religious services, one may infer
that there is indeed believing without belonging. However, individuals who often attend reli-
gious services may have stronger beliefs than individuals attending religious services less
often. In other words, even though more people uphold Christian beliefs than there are church
members, there could be a strong association between the two at the individual level. 
Second, our analysis focuses on believing and belonging in a strict Christian sense. Voas
and Crockett (2005) call this the strong version of believing without belonging. This implies
that where people uphold Christian beliefs but do not attend Christian church services, there
is believing without belonging.1 Davie did not relate Christian beliefs to Christian belong-
ing. For example, if one examines belonging to a Christian church, one should also exam-
ine Christian beliefs rather than belief in any religious faith, since the gap between believing
and belonging would otherwise be overestimated. Therefore, we explicitly focus on the rela-
tionship between Christian believing and Christian belonging (at the individual level). This
offers a new opportunity to test both secularization theory and supply-side theory. The ques-
tions about religious beliefs in the data carry a monotheistic, Christian signature; therefore
we solely focus on Christian believing and belonging. 
Third, with respect to the stability of Christian belief and church attendance, most research
has employed only data from one or two points in time (Davie 1990a; Stark and Iannaccone
1994; 1996). A longer time period is preferable to obtain more accurate estimates of reli-
gious fluctuations. Therefore, we use data from the three waves of the European Value Sur-
vey in addition to similar data for North America, covering the period between 1981 and
2000. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Various explanations have been put forward to explain the strong empirical evidence of
declining church membership and attendance throughout Western Europe (Bruce 2002; Stark
and Iannaccone 1994). Moreover, there is disagreement as to whether the decline in religious
participation has been accompanied by a decline in religious belief as well. 
Secularization theorists argue that practice and belief are directly related. In their view,
believing and belonging follow roughly the same downward trend. This argument contains
a Durkheimian notion of religion. In order to have definite beliefs one is dependent on the
surrounding social environment, at least to some extent (Berger and Luckmann 1974; Bruce
1999). Religious gatherings are assumed to empower creeds, making church membership
and attendance vital for individual religiosity to endure. Consequently, the relationship
between believing and belonging is expected over time to remain about equally strong. How-
ever, if the secularization process in the long run leads to a small proportion of hardcore reli-
gious people and a large proportion of non-religious people, the relationship could become
even stronger. The implication is that believing without belonging is at best a short (indi-
vidual) transitional phase in the emergence of a thoroughly secular culture, and not a new
feature of late modernity (Voas and Crockett 2005). This leads to our first hypothesis:
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H1a. In Western Europe and North America, there has been a decline of both individual Christ-
ian believing and belonging, and therefore the relationship between individual Christian
believing and Christian belonging did not weaken over time.
Supply-side theorists, on the other hand, argue that belief in the supernatural is strong and
reasonably robust, while religious practice might be substantially less in case there is inad-
equate religious supply. While outward expressions of religion—like church membership
and attendance—decline, individual belief endures. Consequently, religious belief becomes
heterogeneous and detached from traditional religious institutions. This results in a growing
gap between believing and belonging. This gap is expected to continue to grow as long as
European governments maintain their support to certain religious traditions, forcing reli-
gious organizations into competition for “customers” and allowing the emergence of reli-
gious pluralism (Finke 1997; Stark and Iannaccone 1994). If, according to supply-side theory,
individual belief endures and belonging declines, the relationship between believing and
belonging will weaken over time. Therefore the competing hypothesis of supply-side theo-
ry reads:
H1b. In Western Europe and North America, individual Christian believing has been stable while
belonging has decreased; therefore the relationship between individual Christian believing
and Christian belonging weakened over time.
Next to trends in believing and belonging and their (changing) relationship we focus on
a factor that might influence this relationship, namely religious pluralism. According to sec-
ularization theory, the plausibility of religion in a monopolistic situation is massive and
durable in consciousness. Furthermore, effective socialization in such a context means that
religion is taken as self-evident (Berger 1967; Berger and Luckmann 1974). In other words,
in a monotheistic society, the religious “canopy” is stable and durable; hence religious belief
and participation are widespread (Berger 1967). Secularization theory assumes that people
who have religious beliefs belong to a church as well. Consequently, the relationship between
believing and belonging is expected to be strong. If more religions co-exist in a society (i.e.,
if there is more religious pluralism), religious plausibility structures supposedly lose strength,
therefore causing secularization. In such a situation, individual disbelief rises and levels of
religious participation decline (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002, 2003). In sum, according to sec-
ularization theory, religious pluralism causes religious belief and participation to decline
simultaneously. Consequently, the relationship between those two remains more or less the
same, regardless of the level of religious pluralism. Correspondingly, hypothesis 2a reads:
H2a. The relationship between individual Christian believing and Christian belonging is inde-
pendent of societies’ level of religious pluralism.
Supply-side theorists, on the other hand, stress that the relation between belief and par-
ticipation is affected by the degree of religious pluralism present in a country. They argue
that the state influences religious participation by regulating religious markets—i.e., allow-
ing religious pluralism via subsidizing or suppressing certain religious traditions (Berger
1967; Stark and Iannaccone 1994). It is assumed that a stable religious demand exists but
also that people differ in their religious desires and tastes. Accordingly, religious diversity
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is rooted in social niches: groups of people sharing the same specific religious preferences
(Finke and Stark 1988; Stark 2001; Stark and Iannaccone 1994). This diverse nature of reli-
gious demand necessitates pluralism. Thus, in societies where religious pluralism is absent
or low, not all are able to satisfy their religious needs. This is due to the inherent inability to
satisfy all distinct consumer preferences where there is only one religious institution (Stark
and Iannaccone 1994). Levels of religious participation will consequently be low. As it is
assumed that all people have more or less stable religious needs, the relationship between
believing and belonging will consequently be weak. When more religious suppliers enter a
religious market, the urge to satisfy demands of individual customers becomes stronger.
Therefore, churches will likely specialize to stay attractive. Thus, the increase in religious
choice enables more people to satisfy their religious needs—and they would express their
belief by going to church—leading to religious revitalization (Finke and Stark 1988). Hence,
a larger proportion of a population will be religiously involved and the relationship between
believing and belonging will be strong. Hence, our hypotheses derived from supply-side the-
ory reads as follows:
H2b. The relationship between individual Christian believing and Christian belonging in soci-
eties with a high degree of religious pluralism is stronger than in societies with a low degree
of religious pluralism. 
DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION
Categories of Religious Pluralism 
Since the often-used index of religious pluralism, the Herfindahl Index, has proven high-
ly problematic (Chaves and Gorski 2001; Voas, Olson, and Crockett 2002), we use Martin’s
(1978) categorization of societies to determine the degree of religious pluralism. Most West-
ern European societies have a long history of a strong bond with the church, which can be
traced as far back as before Emperor Constantine (ca. 285-337 C.E.). In recent history, this
close entanglement of state and church has been largely dissolved. However, the historical
situation in which one or two churches are supported by the state still resonates throughout
Europe. 
Societies with a history of Catholic monopoly, like France, Spain, and Italy, have the least
religious pluralism in Europe nowadays. These nations cannot be said to have an unregulat-
ed religious economy, nor do they have any substantial pluralism (Martin 1978; Stark and
Iannaccone 1994). 
Besides nations with a history of a Catholic monopoly, there are nations that are tradi-
tionally Protestant. Examples are the Scandinavian countries, England, and Canada. These
societies continue to have Protestant monopolies. In most Protestant Western European
nations, especially the Scandinavian countries, there is however some degree of pluralism
but only within the state-church. This makes them slightly more pluralistic than traditional-
ly Catholic societies (Martin 1978). 
Countries like the Netherlands and Germany traditionally have a mixed situation. His-
torically, these societies are partly organized on a confessional basis (Martin 1978). Some-
times, the United Kingdom is also regarded as a religiously mixed country due to the presence
of Catholics and Protestants, with their fierce conflict, in a predominantly Anglican society.
Since we aim here to improve on the work of Davie, we categorize the United Kingdom,
20
Review of Religious Research
similar to Davie, as traditionally mixed (Davie 2002). The United States is characterized by
separation of church and state and a highly unregulated religious economy (Stark and Ian-
naccone 1994), which makes it highly pluralistic.
In sum, societies can range from having virtually no pluralism to having a highly plural-
istic religious economy. Traditionally Catholic countries have virtually no pluralism, while
traditionally Protestant societies have a higher degree of pluralism. Societies with a tradi-
tionally mixed situation are even more pluralistic, while the United States has the highest
degree of pluralism. 
To test our hypotheses we constructed a repeated cross-sectional dataset from the Euro-
pean Value Surveys and the World Value Surveys including the waves from 1981, 1990, and
21
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Table 1
Respondents per Country and Wave
1981 1990 2000 Total per country
Traditionally Catholic societies
     Belgium 1005 2725 1776 5506
     France 836 975 1580 3391
     Ireland 1172 997 969 3138
     Italy 1347 2004 1986 5337
     Spain 2296 4104 2366 8766
Traditionally Protestant societies
     Canada 1254 1650 1840 4744
     Denmark 1165 928 992 3085
     Iceland 823 667 923 2413
     Sweden 884 985 1003 2872
Traditionally mixed societies
     Germany 1297 2079 1080 4456
     Netherlands 1166 974 946 3086
     United Kingdom 1490 1649 894 4033
     United States of America 2206 1593 838 4637
Total N 16941 21330 17193 55464
Source: WVS 1981, 1990, 2000.
2000. We selected the United States, Canada, and 11 Western European countries (Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Unit-
ed Kingdom). Not included were countries that were only available in one or two waves and
countries that missed important items measuring traditional Christian beliefs. East Germany
was excluded because of its post-communist character. The selected respondents were indi-
viduals between 18 and 90 years of age who were either non-denominational or belonged
to a Christian denomination. No adherents of other faiths were included because the focus
of this study is on Christian believing and belonging. These selections resulted in a com-
bined dataset of 55,464 individuals distributed over 13 countries. Table 1 presents the dis-
tribution of respondents over the countries and respective waves.
Variables Measuring Christian Beliefs and Belonging 
The European Value Surveys measure various aspects of Christian belief. We selected
those that were asked in all societies and in all three waves: belief in (i) God, (ii) life after
death, (iii) heaven and (iv) hell.2 The answer categories employed were “no” and “yes.” The
“don’t know” response category turned out to be a small proportion of the respondents, with
an average of approximately 10% in any of the waves. We omitted this category from fur-
ther analyses because the response signifies doubt at the least and disbelief at the most (Bruce
1995; Lechner 1996).3
To answer our research questions we constructed an overall Christian belief scale (Cron-
bach’s alpha = 0.81).4 Respondents had to have a valid answer on at least three of the four
Christian beliefs to be included in the overall scale. Religious participation—belonging—is
measured by church attendance. People were asked how often they attended religious serv-
ices, apart from weddings, funerals and festivities. All holy day categories were merged, as
well as attendance of “less than once a year” and “almost never.” The answer categories
derived thus ranged from “less than once a year” to “more than once a week” and were con-
verted into a per year attendance scale.5 Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the vari-
ables in the analyses.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Range Mean Standard deviation
Belonging 0-104 18.83 30.25
Belief in:      God 0 / 1 0.81 0.39
                     life after death 0 / 1 0.59 0.49
                     heaven 0 / 1 0.53 0.50
                     hell 0 / 1 0.32 0.47
Christian belief 0-1 0.56 0.38
  Source: WVS 1981, 1990, 2000.
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From secularization theory and supply-side theory we inferred competing predictions
about possible changes in Christian belief. To get a detailed picture of the changes in Chris-
tian belief that took place between 1981 and 2000, we first separately analysed each item
that measures an aspect of Christian belief. Since floor and ceiling effects are conceivable,
we used logistic regression to estimate a trend parameter.6 Table 3 displays the results of the
analysis. 
Belief in God declined in more than half of the traditionally Catholic societies. In Ireland
there was no significant change, while in Italy we observed a significant increase. In all of
the traditionally mixed societies and in the United States belief in God has significantly
declined. In half of the traditionally Protestant societies there was no significant change.
Sweden witnessed a decrease in the number of people who believe in God, whereas Den-
mark saw a slight increase. 
Believing in life after death decreased significantly in most Catholic countries. Again, in
Italy we note a rise in belief in life after death. In traditionally Protestant and mixed soci-
eties, the results vary. For instance, in the Netherlands there was no significant change, while
in Iceland, Germany, and the United Kingdom there was a significant decline. In Canada,
Denmark, Sweden, and the United States the number of people who believe in life after death
increased significantly. 
Belief in heaven declined in four out of the five traditionally Catholic societies, only Italy
witnessed an increase. In the traditionally Protestant societies no change was measured in
belief in heaven. In Germany, the percentage of people who believe in heaven did not sig-
nificantly decline, while in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States a
significant downward trend occurred. 
For belief in hell the pattern is diverse. Somewhat less than half of the countries experi-
enced no significant change in belief in hell. In traditionally Catholic societies there was
either a decline or stability, with the exception of Italy where it increased. The opposite was
true for the traditionally Protestant societies, where belief in hell either remained stable or
increased. For the traditionally mixed societies, there was no significant change in the Unit-
ed Kingdom and United States. In Germany belief in hell increased; the Netherlands saw a
decline in the percentage of people who believe in hell. 
Next, we estimated the general trend in Christian belief and belonging as displayed in
Table 4. The largest absolute decrease in Christian belief was found in France (-0.05 per 10
years), whereas the largest increase was in Italy (0.07). In six countries (Belgium, France,
Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom) the trend in Christian belief is sig-
nificantly downward. Interestingly, along with Italy, Germany, and the United States, in none
of the traditionally Protestant societies was there any sign of an overall decrease. 
Almost the same conclusions can be drawn from the estimated trend in church attendance,
that is, Christian belonging. In traditionally Catholic societies, except Italy, and in tradi-
tionally mixed societies, church attendance rates are on the decline. In the traditionally Protes-
tant societies of Denmark and Iceland there is stability, the trend is insignificant for Canada
and modest for Sweden. The United States again shows no change in church attendance rates
during 1981-2000. In order to compare the trends in believing and belonging per country we
also calculated a standardized trend for each country. In most of the countries with a down-
ward trend in believing, the downfall in belonging was relatively stronger. In only two soci-
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eties, Canada and Sweden, did Christian belief remain stable or increase somewhat, while
belonging to a church decreased, indicating a trend towards believing without belonging. 
From secularization theory and supply-side theory, we derived competing predictions
about possible changes in the relationship between Christian believing and belonging. We
then formally tested the extent to which Christian believing and Christian belonging at the
individual level went together over the past two decades. We used OLS regression analysis
to estimate the linear trend in the Pearson correlation coefficients between Christian beliefs
and Christian belonging. Table 5 displays the results.7
With the exception of the United States, all trends in the relationship between believing
and belonging are negative. As pointed out earlier, in only two countries (i.e., Canada and
Sweden) this decrease is the result of stable Christian belief and decreasing church atten-
dance rates (cf. Table 4). In Italy, for instance, the estimated correlation was 0.536 in 1981
and dropped significantly, by 0.05 points every ten years. This, however, is the result of a
trend towards stronger beliefs and higher rates of belonging. Interestingly, the correlation
between believing and belonging in the United States did not change between 1981 and 2000. 
A rather low correlation between believing and belonging does not necessarily imply that
belief is widespread while belonging is marginal. In countries with a history of a religious
monopoly there might well be belonging without believing, i.e., widespread attachment to
institutionalized religion with relatively weak Christian belief (Hamberg and Pettersson
1994). Besides, religiosity may be driven by non-religious incentives. It is known that there
are non-religious sanctions for non-participation in the United States (Chaves and Gorski
2001; Martin 1978; Moore 1994). However, in our analyses we found no corroboration for
these arguments. We thus conclude that the correlations presented indeed reflect believing
without belonging, as found in off-diagonal effects. Changes towards believing without
belonging are stronger and far more common than changes towards belonging without believ-
ing.8 In general, people who have Christian beliefs but do not attend church cause the gap
between Christian believing and Christian belonging rather than individuals belonging to a
Christian church without expressing Christian beliefs. In addition, in traditionally Catholic
and mixed societies correlations between believing and belonging remain high. This indi-
cates that there is no widespread Christian believing without Christian belonging in those
countries. 
In sum, we find evidence in favor of hypothesis 1a: The relationship between believing
and belonging, in general, did not weaken significantly over time. Where the relationship
did weaken, it was not the result of a trend towards believing without belonging. Mostly, any
weakening of this relationship was the product of a process by which both Christian belief
and belonging declined, however—and this is crucial—at different rates. 
The results in Table 5 also provide an answer to the question of the extent to which reli-
gious pluralism influences the relationship between believing and belonging. The relation-
ship between believing and belonging in societies with little religious pluralism is not uniformly
weaker than in societies with a high degree of religious pluralism. The situation in the Unit-
ed States is striking in this respect. Despite a high degree of pluralism, the correlation between
individuals believing and belonging is relatively low. This suggests a relatively great amount
of Christian religiosity outside of churches, compared to countries with a lower degree of
pluralism. Moreover, the correlation between believing and belonging is relatively high in
traditionally Catholic and mixed societies. These findings do not lend support to either hypoth-
esis 2a or 2b. 
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CONCLUSION
In this study we uncovered several important facts associated with Christian religiosity
in modern Western societies. First, we derived testable and rival hypotheses about the rela-
tionship between believing and belonging from secularization and supply-side theory. In this
respect our main finding was that in most countries there is no growing gap between Chris-
tian believing and Christian belonging. The relationship between believing and belonging
at the individual level has remained practically unchanged in the Western world over the past
two decades. As we showed, the slight decrease in the relationship between believing and
belonging that was found for some countries was due to the fact that both believing and
27
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Table 5
 OLS Regression (per country) of Christian Beliefs on Christian Belonging (church
attendance) and Wave, and Observed Correlations between Christian Beliefs and













     Belgium 0.509**  -0.017 0.504 0.496 0.474
     France 0.456**       -0.058** 0.425 0.453 0.342
     Ireland 0.401** -0.019 0.418 0.346 0.384
     Italy 0.536** -0.053** 0.489 0.541 0.411
     Spain 0.555** -0.053** 0.552 0.510 0.452
Traditionally Protestant
societies
     Canada 0.375** -0.034* 0.384 0.330 0.315
     Denmark 0.438** -0.058** 0.451 0.357 0.340
     Iceland 0.212** -0.069** 0.223 0.121 0.089
     Sweden 0.414** -0.039 0.379 0.443 0.314
Traditionally mixed
societies
     Germany 0.549** -0.039* 0.528 0.540 0.455
     Netherlands 0.564** -0.033 0.557 0.549 0.494
     United Kingdom 0.434** -0.054** 0.434 0.383 0.332





** = sign p<0.01 (one-tailed).  Source: WVS 1981, 1990, 2000.
  * = sign p<0.05 (one-tailed).
belonging declined in those countries; but that belonging declined more strongly than believ-
ing. Along with decreasing religious belief, this implies that believing without belonging, as
Voas and Crockett (2005) argued, is at best a short transitional period as a predominantly
secular culture appears and not a characteristic of late modernity. 
Second, secularization theory and supply-side theory are both refuted when it comes to
hypotheses regarding the extent to which religious pluralism influences the relationship
between believing and belonging. The relationship between Christian believing and Chris-
tian belonging varies for societies that differ in their degree of religious pluralism, but not
in the expected direction. Strikingly, the relationship between Christian believing and Chris-
tian belonging is relatively weak in the United States, the most religiously plural country.
This finding is opposite to supply-side theorists’ expectations (Finke 1997; Stark and Ian-
naccone 1994). The relatively weak relationship between Christian believing and Christian
belonging in a highly pluralistic society is in accordance with previous findings of Kelly and
De Graaf (1997). According to supply-side theory, societies with religious monopolies should
have large unmet religious needs, unlike highly pluralistic nations like the United States,
where diverse religious needs are expected to be met. This implies that those who do not
attend church are more devout in monopolistic societies. Like Kelley and De Graaf (1997)
we found the opposite: people who do not, or to a lesser extent, belong are more devout in
religiously pluralistic societies such as the United States than in societies with a low degree
of religious pluralism. Perhaps we should examine more country-specific characteristics to
explain these differences in correlations between believing and belonging.
We can best summarize this study by saying that supply-side theory explains little of the
recent changes of direction in religiosity. For now, secularization theory does a better job.
Most religious beliefs are declining, and the process of secularization seems to continue in
Western societies, with the possible exception of Italy. Although Christian belief is high in
the United States, belief in God and heaven are declining too. It is quite likely that the results
found in this study underestimate the actual situation, due to differences in fertility. Reli-
gious people, on average, have more children than non-religious people (Hout, Greely, and
Wilde 2001). This means that a larger group of people would be somewhere in the transi-
tional phase moving from religious to secular. This would further weaken the relationship
between believing and belonging, since religious people lose their faith more often than non-
religious people become religious. 
A promising avenue for future research would be to take changes in the number of reli-
gious services into account, in addition to religious diversity. Denominations might vary in
the extent to which they invest in their own supply. Availability of religious services does
seem to influence religious participation (Bernts and De Graaf 2003; Hamberg and Petters-
son 1997). This might explain the relative success of predominantly Catholic societies, which
is otherwise a troubling anomaly for supply-side theory (Chaves and Cann 1992; Chaves
and Gorski 2001; Iannaccone 1991).
Processes of secularization in modern Western societies present a complex and mixed
picture. Nevertheless, in this general outline, secularization theory seems most plausible for
the time being, compared to supply-side theory. Unlike Davie, we found no evidence of a
common European trend towards more believing without belonging. When it comes to the
question of whether belonging still accompanies believing, our answer would be yes, at least
for now. 
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Table 6
Traditional Christian Beliefs and Attendance (belonging), in Percentages, per Country
per Wave




Christian beliefs 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
Attendance
never 3.0 0.4 1.7 5.1 2.4 0.5 1.6 4.6 2.5 1.2 5.0 8.7
once a year 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.3 0.1 0.2 0.9 1.2 1.3 0.9 2.1 4.3
on holy days 0.4 0.6 1.9 2.8 1.0 1.5 2.8 5.3 1.8 1.6 6.9 10.3
once a month 0.5 1.4 3.3 5.2 0.5 0.9 4.9 6.3 0.7 1.7 6.5 9.0
once a week 1.8 4.3 51.1 57.1 2.4 5.2 51.4 59.0 2.0 2.8 45.4 50.2
more than once a
week
0.2 0.7 27.7 28.6 0.4 1.1 22.1 23.6 0.2 0.4 16.9 17.5
6.2 7.7 86.1 100 6.9 9.5 83.7 100 8.6 8.6 82.8 100
Belgium.
1981 1990 2000
Christian beliefs 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
Attendance
never 33.0 6.7 6.8 46.5 38.1 4.8 6.1 48.9 38.7 6.6 6.7 52.0
once a year 2.2 0.8 0.8 3.9 2.1 0.5 0.4 3.1 3.3 1.3 0.7 5.4
on holy days 2.5 2.2 2.5 7.2 6.1 4.0 3.1 13.2 7.8 4.2 4.4 16.3
once a month 2.5 1.2 4.3 8.0 3.1 2.0 2.9 7.9 2.9 1.9 3.7 8.5
once a week 4.7 4.9 20.5 30.1 3.9 4.8 12.7 21.3 2.6 3.0 8.0 13.6
more than once a
week
0.3 0.3 3.7 4.3 0.7 0.6 4.3 5.6 0.1 0.5 3.7 4.3
45.2 16.1 38.7 100 53.9 16.7 29.4 100 55.4 17.4 27.2 100
France.
1981 1990 2000
Christian beliefs 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
Attendance
never 35.2 8.4 9.0 52.5 47.2 7.4 6.4 61.0 49.6 8.7 11.2 69.4
once a year 2.5 1.3 1.3 5.2 4.1 1.4 1.6 7.0 3.0 1.1 1.9 6.0
on holy days 6.3 4.2 7.0 17.5 5.8 3.8 5.6 15.2 5.2 2.4 5.6 13.2
once a month 1.2 2.4 5.4 9.0 0.9 1.6 4.4 6.9 0.5 1.5 2.3 4.3
once a week 0.4 2.7 11.0 14.2 0.4 1.2 7.0 8.6 0.2 0.8 4.3 5.3
more than once a
week
0.1 0.3 1.2 1.6 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.2 0.2 0.3 1.2 1.7
45.5 19.3 34.9 100 58.4 15.4 26.2 100 58.7 14.8 26.5 100
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Italy.
1981 1990 2000
Christian beliefs 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
Attendance
never 21.1 2.8 3.7 27.6 15.3 2.5 1.9 19.7 9.5 3.2 3.3 16.1
once a year 2.9 1.2 0.9 5.1 2.1 0.9 1.3 4.4 1.9 0.6 1.3 3.8
on holy days 8.1 3.2 7.6 18.9 8.8 3.8 7.8 20.3 6.7 5.3 12.3 24.3
once a month 3.5 3.5 6.9 13.9 2.4 2.2 8.0 12.7 2.3 2.6 8.2 13.1
once a week 3.3 3.9 19.7 26.9 2.0 3.9 25.0 30.9 2.7 4.2 24.3 31.3
more than once a
week
0.4 0.5 6.6 7.5 0.3 0.7 11.0 12.1 0.4 0.9 10.3 11.5
39.3 15.2 45.5 100 30.9 14.0 55.1 100 23.5 16.8 59.7 100
Spain.
1981 1990 2000
Christian beliefs 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
Attendance
never 19.5 5.9 5.6 31.0 28.5 4.9 7.2 40.7 28.3 5.5 9.4 43.2
once a year 1.9 1.1 1.2 4.2 1.5 0.8 1.4 3.7 1.5 1.2 1.9 4.6
on holy days 3.1 2.6 3.1 8.8 5.2 3.3 6.3 14.8 5.2 2.5 6.4 14.2
once a month 2.1 2.3 7.6 11.9 1.5 2.0 5.6 9.1 2.3 1.8 7.2 11.2
once a week 2.1 3.9 26.0 32.0 2.1 3.0 17.2 22.3 1.9 2.1 14.7 18.7
more than once a
week
0.2 0.8 11.2 12.2 0.3 0.5 8.6 9.5 0.2 0.7 7.1 8.0
28.2 16.6 54.6 100 39.2 14.6 46.2 100 39.4 13.9 46.7 100
Canada.
1981 1990 2000
Christian beliefs 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
Attendance
never 10.2 5.8 14.6 30.6 15.0 4.9 14.4 34.3 10.7 5.2 17.8 33.7
once a year 2.0 1.7 5.2 9.0 1.7 1.3 5.2 8.3 1.8 1.5 7.1 10.3
on holy days 2.4 3.1 7.6 13.1 2.4 2.9 10.9 16.2 1.6 2.9 12.1 16.6
once a month 1.3 2.1 10.8 14.2 1.0 2.2 9.3 12.5 1.0 1.2 8.1 10.3
once a week 0.5 2.4 21.7 24.6 0.8 1.9 18.8 21.5 0.5 1.0 19.9 21.5
more than once a
week
0.2 0.2 8.2 8.6 0.2 0.7 6.3 7.2 0.0 0.7 6.9 7.6
16.6 15.3 68.1 100 21.2 13.8 65.0 100 15.7 12.4 72.0 100
Denmark.
1981 1990 2000
Christian beliefs 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
Attendance
never 52.0 3.6 4.2 59.8 45.9 6.1 5.1 57.0 40.3 7.0 4.3 51.6
once a year 11.5 1.1 1.9 14.5 9.1 3.9 2.3 15.3 11.1 2.9 2.6 16.6
on holy days 10.9 1.9 2.4 15.2 12.4 2.3 2.1 16.8 12.5 4.0 3.6 20.2
once a month 2.3 0.8 4.3 7.3 2.3 1.7 4.3 8.3 3.6 2.5 2.9 9.0
once a week 0.0 0.1 2.9 3.0 0.1 0.3 1.9 2.3 0.1 0.3 1.5 1.9
more than once a
week
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.87
76.7 7.5 15.8 100 69.9 14.2 15.8 100 67.7 16.8 15.5 100
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Iceland.
1981 1990 2000
Christian beliefs 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
Attendance
never 16.9 9.9 20.3 47.2 13.5 11.4 19.1 43.9 16.3 8.0 19.3 43.6
once a year 3.1 3.7 8.5 15.3 3.7 3.2 8.8 15.7 3.5 3.6 11.1 18.2
on holy days 3.1 5.5 18.1 26.7 2.8 8.0 20.4 31.2 3.6 7.2 15.8 26.6
once a month 0.3 1.0 6.8 8.1 1.1 0.9 5.2 7.3 0.4 1.9 6.7 9.0
once a week 0.0 0.1 2.0 2.1 0.0 0.4 1.1 1.5 0.4 0.5 1.2 2.1
more than once a
week
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.4
23.4 20.2 56.4 100 21.1 23.9 55.0 100 24.2 21.6 54.2 100
Sweden.
1981 1990 2000
Christian beliefs 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
Attendance
never 45.3 5.4 4.6 55.2 53.4 6.9 6.5 66.9 44.2 7.8 7.3 59.3
once a year 10.1 3.6 4.2 17.9 6.7 1.8 1.7 10.1 11.9 3.8 5.1 20.7
on holy days 8.0 2.0 3.1 13.0 5.8 1.5 4.1 11.4 4.1 3.0 3.8 10.9
once a month 1.5 1.1 6.0 8.6 1.0 1.2 4.0 6.2 1.0 0.6 3.6 5.2
once a week 0.3 0.0 2.6 2.9 0.3 0.1 3.1 3.5 0.2 0.1 3.1 3.5
more than once a
week
0.2 0.3 1.8 2.3 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.9 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5
65.3 12.4 22.3 100 67.1 11.6 21.3 100 61.5 15.4 23.1 100
Germany.
1981 1990 2000
Christian beliefs 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
Attendance
never 34.2 4.9 3.1 42.3 34.3 4.2 4.5 43.1 33.6 3.9 3.3 40.8
once a year 6.6 1.9 1.4 9.9 5.4 1.7 0.9 8.0 4.8 1.1 1.5 7.4
on holy days 5.6 4.4 2.9 12.8 6.6 3.9 4.1 14.5 10.9 3.3 5.0 19.2
once a month 3.2 4.1 7.2 14.5 3.7 3.2 7.1 14.0 4.2 4.7 8.6 17.5
once a week 1.8 2.1 12.4 16.2 0.7 2.4 13.5 16.6 2.7 2.8 7.9 13.3
more than once a
week
0.1 0.5 3.6 4.3 0.0 0.4 3.4 3.7 0.0 0.2 1.5 1.7
51.5 17.9 30.6 100 50.7 15.7 33.6 100 56.2 16.0 27.8 100
Netherlands.
1981 1990 2000
Christian beliefs 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
Attendance
never 36.3 4.1 5.5 45.9 39.8 5.0 4.7 49.4 42.1 8.7 7.3 58.1
once a year 2.6 1.0 0.7 4.2 4.1 0.7 1.2 6.1 3.9 1.6 1.0 6.6
on holy days 4.0 2.6 2.5 9.0 8.1 3.3 4.6 16.0 6.3 2.7 4.3 13.2
once a month 3.3 2.9 6.8 13.0 2.6 2.4 4.8 9.8 2.3 2.1 5.8 10.2
once a week 1.2 2.8 19.4 23.4 1.6 2.2 11.4 15.2 0.7 0.9 6.7 8.4
more than once a
week
0.4 0.2 3.7 4.3 0.0 0.2 3.2 3.5 0.1 0.2 3.1 3.5
47.9 13.6 38.5 100 56.1 13.9 30.0 100 55.5 16.2 28.3 100
NOTES
*All correspondence can be directed to the principal author: O. Aarts, Radboud University Nijmegen, ICS/Soci-
ology, P.O. Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Tel. +31-24-361-2337. E-mail: O.Aarts@maw.ru.nl. 
1The weak version of believing without belonging is, according to Voas and Crockett (2005), a comparison of
Christian belonging with whatever individuals express as religious beliefs. Beliefs in the weak version can be as
vague as a belief in “something.” We argue that the strong version provides more insight into the process of sec-
ularization and religious vitality than the weaker version since the latter is rather difficult, if not impossible, to
falsify.
2Although the beliefs used here are not solely Christian, they are definitely typical of Christian religions.
3We also merged the “don’t know” and “no” categories. This did not substantially change our results. Of all
estimated trends, 45 remained the same, in two cases the trends became even more significant and in five cases
significant trends disappeared. 
4For the 1981, 1990, and 2000 waves, Cronbach’s alphas were also calculated for each country separately, all
resulted in reliable scales with no substantial deviations from the overall Cronbach’s alpha. Results are available
at http://www.ru.nl/methodenentechnieken/bb/results/. 
5The distribution of the church attendance measure (a per year scale) is skewed to the right in most countries,
which might result in non-linear relationships between Christian belief and church attendance. Consequently, the
Pearson correlation coefficients (cf. Table 4) could be an underestimation of the real relationship between Chris-
tian belief and church attendance. To check whether skewness is a serious problem, we computed for each coun-
try and wave the Eta coefficient (we assume Christian belief to be metric). Next, we compared each observed
Pearson correlation coefficient and the Eta counterpart and found only small differences. This led us to conclude
that it is warranted to present the widely used and easy to compute Pearson correlation coefficient instead of Eta
figures. Results are available at http://www.ru.nl/methodenentechnieken/bb/results/.
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United Kingdom.
1981 1990 2000
Christian beliefs 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
Attendance
never 21.4 8.8 18.6 48.8 25.7 6.8 17.1 49.6 31.9 6.1 23.8 61.8
once a year 2.3 1.0 3.7 7.0 2.1 1.6 4.1 7.8 2.0 1.2 3.6 6.8
on holy days 1.7 1.9 5.6 9.1 2.7 1.7 6.2 10.6 3.6 1.2 6.4 11.2
once a month 0.9 0.8 8.5 10.2 0.9 1.3 8.6 10.8 0.5 0.3 4.1 4.9
once a week 0.6 0.8 15.3 16.8 0.7 1.8 13.3 15.8 0.8 0.9 8.3 10.0
more than once a
week
0.0 0.1 8.0 8.1 0.1 0.3 4.9 5.3 0.0 0.2 5.2 5.3
26.9 13.4 59.7 100 32.3 13.5 54.2 100 38.7 9.9 51.4 100
United States of America.
1981 1990 2000
Christian beliefs 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
Attendance
never 3.4 2.4 14.7 20.4 5.1 2.8 15.8 23.7 5.3 2.5 12.9 20.7
once a year 0.5 0.6 5.1 6.2 0.7 0.5 5.2 6.3 0.6 0.8 6.8 8.2
on holy days 0.7 0.8 8.4 9.8 0.9 1.0 5.6 7.5 0.3 1.0 7.8 9.1
once a month 0.6 1.3 15.7 17.6 0.8 1.4 12.5 14.8 0.1 1.3 13.2 14.6
once a week 0.4 1.1 29.6 31.0 0.7 1.3 30.2 32.1 0.8 0.3 31.5 32.5
more than once a
week
0.1 0.5 14.4 14.9 0.0 0.5 15.1 15.5 0.0 0.4 14.5 14.9
5.5 6.7 87.9 100 8.2 7.4 84.4 100 7.1 6.2 86.6 100
6At the individual level, we used the following logistic equation:
Log(p1/(1–p1) = a + b1*wave. In this equation, p1 is the probability of scoring 1 on any of the items measur-
ing Christian belief, and b1 is the trend parameter indicating whether this particular item became more popular
(positive b) or less popular (negative b) over the years. Note that the variable wave is a metric measure with three
categories: 1981, 1990, and 2000. 
7In Table 5 the individual scores on Christian beliefs (Likert-scale) and Christian belonging have been stan-
dardized within each country and wave (average=0, standard deviation=1). Then, we estimated for each country
an OLS model with Christian beliefs regressed on belonging and the interaction between belonging and wave (the
intercept and the b-coefficient for wave equal zero because of within country/wave standardization). The b-coef-
ficient for belonging denotes the estimated correlation in 1981 while the b-coefficient for belonging*wave denotes
the (linear) decennial change of the 1981 correlation. Because we assume a linear change, this is an approxima-
tion of the observed correlations in our samples. Therefore, we provided also these observed correlations between
Christian beliefs and Christian belonging within each country and wave. So, in the sample from Belgium a cor-
relation of 0.504 was found, while in the OLS regression this correlation is estimated to be 0.509. The observed
correlation in 1990 amounts to 0.496 (decline of 0.008) while it amounts to 0.474 in 2000 (decline of 0.022).
According to OLS estimates the correlation dropped (linear) from 0.509 in 1981 to 0.492 in 1990, to 0.475 in
2000 (decennial linear change -0.017 and non-significant). Overall, the differences between the observed corre-
lations per wave and the correlations assuming linear change are small. They can be calculated from Table 5 and
available at http://www.ru.nl/methodenentechnieken/bb/results/.
8For a complete overview of the relationship between individual believing and individual belonging, we refer
to Table 6 in the appendix.
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